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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
A jury in the District Court awarded more than $4.5 
million to a class of dancers at the Penthouse Club, an “adult 
gentleman’s club” in Philadelphia owned and operated by 
3001 Castor, Inc., for unpaid minimum wages and unjust 
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enrichment under Pennsylvania law.  The Court denied the 
motion of Castor to set aside the verdict, and it appeals to us.  
We join our District Court colleague, Judge Brody, in 
concluding that, as a matter of “economic reality,” the dancers 
were employees of Castor, not its independent contractors, and 
we reject Castor’s novel argument that the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) precludes the class’s claims for unjust 
enrichment.  We also conclude that Castor is not entitled to any 
credit or offset against the jury award for payments already 
received by the dancers.  We thus affirm across the board and 
sustain the jury’s verdict.  
I. Background 
Priya Verma was a dancer at the Penthouse Club, a 
nightclub in Philadelphia operated by Castor.  As Judge Brody 
explained, the Club provides “topless female dancers” who 
“entertain [Castor’s] customers by performing seductive 
dances.”  Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 2014 WL 2957453, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 2014).  As the Club’s owner and operator, 
Castor controlled its atmosphere, policies, operations, and 
marketing.  
Dancers at the Club were classified into two categories:  
“Entertainers” and “Freelancers.”  It required Entertainers to 
commit to working at least four days per week and submit a 
weekly schedule.  Freelancers had no such commitments.  
Castor required each dancer in both categories to sign an 
agreement stating that she is an independent contractor.   
Dancers at the Club worked in shifts.  They could 
choose among five:  a “day shift” lasting from noon to 6:00 
p.m.; a “mid shift” from 3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.; a “preferred 
shift” from 6:00 p.m. to midnight; a “premium shift” from 8:00 
p.m. to 2:00 a.m.; and a “power shift” from 10:00 p.m. to 2:00 
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a.m.  A dancer had to “rent” stage time for each shift she 
worked.  The rates for these “stage-rental fees” varied 
depending on the shift and were lower for Entertainers than for 
Freelancers.  Dancers performed in two locations:  on the 
Club’s main stage and in private dance rooms. 
The Club did not pay dancers a wage; their 
compensation consisted entirely of (1) “tips” they received 
when dancing on stage or (2) fixed “dance fees” at rates 
established by the Club, which they received from giving 
“private dances” in the private dance rooms.  The Club also 
took a fee, called a “room-rental fee,” for each private dance.  
Castor also required the dancers to “tip out” certain individuals 
who worked at the Club.  These “mandatory tip-outs” had to 
be paid for each shift regardless how much money the dancer 
made in the shift.  They included $15 to the Club’s disc jockey, 
$10 to the “house mom” (who kept track of the dancers’ 
schedules and assisted them in other ways), and $5 to the 
podium host, for a total of $30 per shift. 
The Club provided training to the dancers and closely 
reviewed their attendance, appearance, demeanor, and 
customer service.  It also had a strict set of rules the dancers 
must follow.  When they violated those rules, they were fined 
amounts ranging from $10 to $100.   
In 2013 Verma filed this action against Castor on behalf 
of herself and similarly situated current and former dancers at 
the Club.  She alleged claims for minimum wages and overtime 
under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a), 216(b), 
analogous claims for minimum wages and overtime under the 
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 Pa. Stat. 
§§ 333.104 & .113, a claim for non-payment of wages under 
the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. 
Stat. § 260.9a, and a claim for unjust enrichment under 
Pennsylvania common law. 
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On the FLSA claims, Verma alleged an “opt-in” 
collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  See Knepper v. 
Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2012).1  On the 
state-law claims, she pursued a damages class action under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).2  The case proceeded 
                                              
1 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides that private claims under the 
FLSA may be pursued collectively “by any one or more 
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.”  Unlike class actions under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FLSA collective actions 
under § 216(b) are “opt in” actions—that is, “[n]o employee 
shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his 
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is 
filed in the court in which such action is brought.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b).  The procedures for these collective actions, which 
are not disputed here, have been described in prior cases.  See, 
e.g., Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 
2012).  
 
2 Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained 
if the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and “the court finds 
that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”  The requirements of Rule 23(a) are having 
(1) so many class members that joinder is impractical, 
(2) questions of law or fact that are common to the class, (3) 
one or more representatives whose claims or defenses are 
typical of those in the class, and (4) representatives who will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
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along two tracks:  one under the collective-action provisions of 
the FLSA, and another under the class-action procedures of 
Rule 23.  We and other circuits have endorsed this dual-track 
procedure, which is used widely to pursue wage-and-hour 
cases in federal court simultaneously under federal and state 
law.  See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 262 (collecting cases). 
After some discovery, the District Court entered an 
order conditionally certifying a collective action under the 
FLSA comprising current and former dancers of the Club 
during the covered time period.  3001 Castor, 2014 WL 
2957453, at *13.  A notice was sent to potential members of 
the collective action, and 22 dancers filed consent forms to join 
the action as “opt-in” plaintiffs.  (For convenience, Verma and 
the opt-in plaintiffs are described as “plaintiffs.”)  The District 
Court also ruled, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs and the other 
dancers were “employees” of Castor under the FLSA and the 
PMWA.  Id. at *4–10.  
After further discovery, the Court entered an order 
granting final certification of the FLSA collective action 
(covering both the minimum-wage and overtime claims) and 
granting in part Verma’s motion for class certification under 
Rule 23.  See Verma v. 3001 Castor, 2016 WL 6962522, at *6, 
*14 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2016).  The Court certified a Rule 
23(b)(3) class with respect to the following claims under 
Pennsylvania law:  (i) a claim for minimum wages under the 
PMWA, (ii) a claim for overtime under the PMWA, and (iii) a 
claim for unjust enrichment based on deductions for mandatory 
tip-outs.  (It denied class certification to the extent plaintiffs 
sought to recover deductions for stage-rental fees, fines, and 
room-rental fees.  Id. at *10–11.) 
A couple weeks before trial, plaintiffs and Castor 
purportedly reached an agreement in principle to settle an aspect 
of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.  The terms of that alleged settlement 
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are not in the record, and there appears to be disagreement 
between counsel concerning what those terms are and whether an 
agreement was actually reached.  What we know is this:  plaintiffs 
were to receive $109,000 in exchange for not presenting at trial 
some portion of their FLSA claims.   
Shortly after the alleged settlement, Castor filed a 
motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  It argued that a settlement concerning the FLSA 
claims—the only federal claims involved—deprived the 
District Court of jurisdiction over the case.  The Court denied 
that motion because, in its view, it retained supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  
The remaining claims—class claims for minimum wages 
under the PMWA, overtime under the PMWA, and unjust 
enrichment—went to trial.  The jury returned a verdict awarding 
the class more than $4.5 million:  $2,610,322.61 for its 
minimum wage claims and $1,948,400.12 for its unjust 
enrichment claims.  Castor filed post-trial motions asking the 
Court to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, to reconsider 
its summary-judgment rulings, and to enter judgment for 
Castor as a matter of law.  The Court denied those motions and 
entered final judgment on the verdict.  Castor appeals to us.  
II. Discussion 
We have jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the 
District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Stecyk v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Castor challenges on several grounds the District Court’s 
judgment entering the $4.5 million jury verdict.  We address 
each in turn.  
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A. The District Court’s Jurisdiction 
Castor contends the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to try this case.  It claims the Court should have 
granted its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction after the 
parties reached an agreement in principle to settle an aspect of 
plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.  According to Castor, once those 
claims were excised from the case, the Court should not have 
exercised supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a).  Instead, 
it should have dismissed plaintiffs’ state-law claims because 
(i) they presented “novel or complex issue[s] of State law,” 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (ii) they “substantially 
predominate[d]” over the federal claims, id. § 1367(c)(2), and 
(iii) it was improper to try the state-law claims on their own.  
We need not review the decision to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction in these circumstances.  Irrespective 
whether the District Court had that jurisdiction, it no doubt had 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims under the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109–2, 
119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of Title 28 of the U.S. 
Code).  That statute gives district courts original jurisdiction 
over class actions that (i) involve more than 100 class 
members, (ii) have an aggregate amount in controversy greater 
than $5 million, and (iii) have diversity of citizenship between 
any class member and any defendant.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  
Those criteria clearly were met here:  the complaint alleged a 
class of more than 300 dancers, an aggregate amount in 
controversy more than $5 million, and the requisite diversity 
of citizenship.   
Castor contends that CAFA’s amount-in-controversy 
requirement was not satisfied because the maximum damages 
the dancers could recover was only around $700,000.  We 
disagree for two reasons.  First, because Castor did not raise a 
factual challenge to the complaint’s CAFA allegations until the 
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eve of trial, the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint are 
controlling.  See Neale v. Volvo Cars of N.A., LLC, 794 F.3d 
353, 357 n.1 (2015) (where no factual challenge is raised to 
CAFA allegations, they are controlling unless “it is clear to a 
legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount 
claimed”); see also Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC 
v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553 (2014) (“When a plaintiff 
invokes federal-court jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s amount-in-
controversy allegation is accepted if made in good faith.”); 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 
395–96 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[U]nder a long-standing rule, federal 
diversity jurisdiction is generally determined based on the 
circumstances prevailing at the time the suit was filed.” 
(quotation and brackets omitted)).   
Second, even if we were to consider Castor’s belated 
factual challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction under 
CAFA, we would easily conclude from the record—including 
the approximately $4.5 million jury verdict—that the amount 
in controversy exceeded $5 million all along.  The verdict does 
not include attorneys’ fees, which do count for CAFA’s 
amount-in-controversy threshold, see Neale, 794 F.3d at 357 
n.1, and was entered based on a narrower scope of issues (and 
thus a smaller amount in controversy) than were initially pled 
in the complaint, see Verma Br. at 17–18 (summarizing the 
additional categories of alleged damages the District Court 
excluded from class certification).  As we recently explained, 
a putative class action’s qualification for CAFA jurisdiction is 
determined based on the class action that is “filed” under Rule 
23—in other words, the class action that is alleged.  Coba v. 
Ford Motor Co., --- F.3d ---, 2019 WL 3367573, at *3 (3d Cir. 
July 26, 2019).  We thus conclude that CAFA’s amount-in-
controversy requirement was met here in any event.  In short, 
the District Court had jurisdiction under CAFA to determine 
the class’s state-law claims. 
10 
 
We also believe the Court acted within its discretion to 
exercise jurisdiction over those claims under § 1367(a).  
Before the FLSA claims were dropped, the overlap between 
the federal and state-law claims was substantial.  Allowing 
Verma to pursue them through the customary “dual-track” 
procedure we endorsed in Knepper was reasonable.  675 F.3d 
at 262.  And although the federal claims were not presented at 
trial, the Court may have reasonably concluded that 
“considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness 
to the parties provide[d] an affirmative justification for” 
exercising jurisdiction.  Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 
(3d Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). 
B. The District Court’s Pre-trial “Employee” 
Ruling  
As noted, before trial the District Court ruled as a matter 
of law that plaintiffs and the other dancers were “employees” 
of Castor under the FLSA and the PMWA.  Castor claims that 
ruling erred and asks us to reverse it.  But before reaching this 
issue, we address a threshold argument made by the class.  
1. Appellate Jurisdiction 
Verma contends we lack jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s classification of the dancers as employees.  
She claims that ruling is unreviewable either because (a) it was 
part of an unappealable order denying a motion for summary 
judgment, or (b) Castor forfeited any challenge to that ruling 
by not objecting at trial when the Court instructed the jury that 
“[the Court] ha[s] already determined that Verma and the other 
Dancers were employees, not independent contractors.”  
Verma Br. at 24–25.  
Both contentions miss the mark.  Regardless how it was 
labeled, the Court’s ruling that Verma and the other dancers by 
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law are employees was in substance a partial grant of summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs on each of their claims that was 
premised on the existence of that employer–employee 
relationship.  As such, we can review it under the “merger 
rule,” which provides that interlocutory orders, such as partial 
grants of summary judgment, “merge with the final judgment 
in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that they 
affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the 
final order.”  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 
696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 
117, 121 n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause interlocutory orders 
such as partial grants of summary judgment merge with the 
final judgment, they can be challenged on appeal.”).  
As an aside, we note that Castor did not explicitly 
identify the District Court’s partial grant of summary judgment 
in its notice of appeal; instead it identified the Court’s order 
denying the motion to reconsider its grant of partial summary 
judgment.  But that does not bar our review.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over orders “that are not specified in the 
notice of appeal where: (1) there is a connection between the 
specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the 
unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not 
prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  
Trzaska v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quotation omitted).  These requirements are all met here:  the 
specified and unspecified orders were both related to Castor’s 
opposition to summary judgment on the 
employee/independent-contractor issue, Castor’s intention to 
appeal that issue is evident from the 15 pages it devoted to the 
issue in its opening brief, and plaintiffs took their full 




That brings us to the merits of the District Court’s 
“employee” ruling.  Whether a worker is an employee or an 
independent contractor under the FLSA or PMWA is a mixed 
question of fact and law.  See Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 
1286, 1292 (3d Cir. 1991).  The fact component is the 
combination of disputed and undisputed facts that comprise the 
economic relations between the worker and the alleged 
employer.  The law component is the conclusion of whether 
those facts make a worker an “employee” or “independent 
contractor.”  In some cases, one or more genuine issues of fact 
concerning the relevant economic relations may preclude a trial 
court from drawing a conclusion as a matter of law on the 
“employee” or “independent contractor” issue.  In those cases 
the issue would go to trial, with the jury resolving it through 
either special interrogatories or by deciding the classification 
issue.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49.  But in other cases, as here, the 
district court may resolve the issue before trial based on 
undisputed facts in the record.  In those cases we do a fresh 
review on appeal of the court’s determination.  Selker Bros., 949 
F.2d at 1292. 
We use a six-factor test to determine whether a worker is 
an “employee” or an “independent contractor” under the FLSA.  
See id. at 1293.  Pennsylvania courts use the same test under the 
PMWA.  Pa. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Stuber, 822 A.2d 870, 
873 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Pennsylvania v. 
Stuber, 859 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2004).  Those factors are: 
(1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to 
control the manner in which the work is to be 
performed;  
(2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit 
or loss depending upon [her] managerial skill;  
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(3) the alleged employee’s investment in 
equipment or materials required for [her] task, or 
[her] employment of helpers;  
(4) whether the service rendered requires a special 
skill;  
(5) the degree of permanence of the working 
relationship; [and] 
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part 
of the alleged employer’s business. 
Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1293; accord Donovan v. 
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1379 (3d Cir. 1985).  
Notably, none of these factors asks whether the worker 
signed an agreement stating that she is an “independent 
contractor,” as Castor required of the dancers here.  That is not 
surprising.  The whole point of the FLSA and the PMWA is to 
protect workers by overriding contractual relations through 
statute.  See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 
(1945) (“The [FLSA] statute was a recognition of the fact that 
due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and 
employee, certain segments of the population required federal 
compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts . . . .”); 43 
Pa. Stat. § 333.101 (declaring that employees covered by the 
protections of the PMWA “are not as a class on a level of 
equality in bargaining with their employers in regard to 
minimum fair wage standards, and ‘freedom of contract’ as 
applied to their relations with their employers is illusory”).  
In any event, no one factor is dispositive.  Rather, a 
court should consider them together in the “circumstances of 
the whole activity” to determine whether the worker is 
“dependent upon the business to which [she] render[s] service” 
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or is, “as a matter of economic reality,” operating an 
independent business for herself.  Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 
1293 (quoting DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1382 (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
i. Employer’s right to control the 
manner in which the work is to be 
performed 
Castor contends the dancers had substantial control over 
their work.  It emphasizes that they (i) set their own hours, 
(ii) could opt among different shifts with varying stage-rental 
fees, (iii) decided whether to be Entertainers (requiring a 
weekly four-shift commitment for lower stage-rental fees) or 
Freelancers (no weekly commitment but higher stage-rental 
fees), (iv) determined whether to stay beyond the end of their 
shifts to continue working, and (v) chose whether to accept or 
reject requests for private dances. 
But beyond these narrow choices made by the dancers, 
which primarily relate to the shifts they selected, the Club 
exerted overwhelming control over the performance of their 
work.  It (i) established the available shift times, (ii) checked 
the dancers’ shift attendance and fined them $10 for every 30 
minutes they were late, (iii) instructed the dancers on their 
physical appearance and dictated their choice of dress, hair, 
and makeup, (iv) determined the songs and number of songs 
that play when a dancer is dancing, (v) forbade them from 
smoking, chewing gum, or using their cellphones while on the 
dance floor, (vi) banned changing into their street clothes 
before the end of their shifts, and (vii) set the price and duration 
of all private dances. 
On balance, the control factor weighs strongly in favor 
of “employee” status.  See id. at 1294 (employer’s control over 
gas station operators shown by findings that owner “set the 
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price[s] of cash sales,” visited the gas stations regularly “to 
oversee its operations,” and “controlled the hours of operation 
and the appearance of the stations”); see also McFeeley v. 
Jackson Street Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241–42 (4th Cir. 
2016) (nightclub owner’s pervasive control over exotic dancers 
shown by findings that nightclub reviewed attendance, 
imposed guidelines on dancers’ appearance, set the fees for 
private dances, instructed dancers on their demeanor and 
performance, and managed the club’s atmosphere and 
clientele).  
ii. Employee’s opportunity for profit 
or loss depending upon her 
managerial skill 
Castor places significant weight on this factor.  
Throughout its brief it characterizes the dancers as 
“entrepreneurs” who “invested” their time and money in shifts 
at the Club in exchange for the opportunity to make money.  It 
emphasizes that, in a given shift, dancers could make anywhere 
from profits in excess of $1,600 to a loss (due to paying stage-
rental fees and mandatory tip-outs).  It argues that each dancer 
had control over her own profits and losses based on her 
attraction of followers (through social media platforms, for 
example) along with “her dancing skills . . . and her skills at 
creating a fantasy.” 
But this factor also weighs in favor of employee status.  
Although each dancer had some degree of control over her 
profits and losses, “managerial skill”—the relevant factor 
here—had minimal influence on them.  It was the Club, not the 
dancers, that determined its hours, decided whether to charge 
admission fees, set the price for drinks and food, determined 
the length and price of dances on stage and in private rooms, 
and managed its atmosphere, operations, and advertising.  
Further, the dancers’ skills in “dancing” and “creating a 
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fantasy” are not the kinds of “managerial skills” that can weigh 
in favor of independent-contractor status.  See Selker Bros., 
949 F.2d at 1294; Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 
324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that exotic 
dancers’ control over their profits through “initiative, hustle, 
and costume” weighed in favor of independent-contractor 
status); McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 243 (observing that courts have 
“almost universally rejected” the argument that dancers control 
their opportunities for losses and profits because they can 
“hustle” to increase their tips and dance fees). 
iii. Employee’s investment in 
equipment or materials required 
for her task, or her employment of 
helpers 
Castor argues weakly that dancers “invest” in their trade 
by paying the Club’s stage-rental fees each shift.  But this falls 
in favor of “employee” status.  Castor owns and maintains the 
Club’s premises, pays its licensing fees, purchases alcohol for 
it, and manages, pays and trains its personnel.  As Judge Brody 
noted, courts that have considered similar economic 
arrangements have all concluded that “a dancer’s investment is 
minor when compared to the club’s investment.”  3001 Castor, 
2014 WL 2957453, at *8 (quotation omitted) (collecting 
cases).  We reach the same conclusion. 
iv. Whether the service rendered 
requires a special skill 
As noted, Castor maintains that dancers have control 
over the quality of their performance through their “dancing 
skills” and “skills at creating a fantasy.”  The District Court 
aptly described the skills that contribute to dancers’ 
performance of their “primary job responsibilities [of] topless 
dances on stage and . . . private dances [for] the club’s 
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customers”:  they should be “fluid” dancers and have good 
“appearance[,] . . . social skills, [and] hygiene.”  Id. at *9.  We 
refuse to recognize these as “special skills” that weigh in favor 
of independent-contractor status.  Although we have not drawn 
a bright line between “special” and other skills for purposes of 
our six-factor test, we do not believe “appearance,” “social 
skills,” and “hygiene” qualify.  See Reich, 998 F.2d at 328 
(nude dancers “do not exhibit the skill or initiative indicative 
of persons in business for themselves”); see also Hopkins v. 
Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that managers’ “skills to effectively manage their offices and 
teams . . . are not specialized skills . . . [because] they are 
abilities common to all effective managers” (emphasis in 
original)).  
v. The degree of permanence of the 
working relationship 
The permanence factor is Castor’s strongest.  It 
submitted attendance data showing that dancers at the Club 
typically are a transient group.  The average dancer in the class 
worked for the Club in only 14 of the 109 workweeks in the 
class period, and none of the dancers who rented stage time at 
the Club during the class period rented time slots totaling more 
than 40 hours in a given week.  In addition, throughout the class 
period the dancers were free to work at other venues, including 
for Castor’s competitors.  The District Court was correct to 
conclude this factor tips to an independent-contractor 
relationship.  Notably, however, the two Circuits who have 
considered similar circumstances—the Fourth and the Fifth—
both assigned little weight to this factor.  See McFeeley, 825 
F.3d at 244; Reich, 998 F.2d at 328–29.  Castor gives no 
persuasive reason for us to diverge from those Circuits.  
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vi. Whether the service rendered is an 
integral part of the alleged 
employer’s business 
The last factor weighs clearly in favor of an employee 
relationship.  Castor markets the Club as an “adult gentleman’s 
club.”  Its primary offering to customers is topless female 
dancers who dance on stage and give lap dances in private 
rooms.  (To its credit, Castor does not argue that anyone comes 
to the Club for the food, drinks, or any reason other than to see 
the dancers.)  They are the providers of that offering.  There is 
no question they render a service that is integral to the Club’s 
business.  
* * * * * 
Having reviewed the six factors, we perform a holistic 
assessment.  Although our judgment is binary—that is, either 
employee or independent contractor—“the 
employee/independent contractor distinction is not a bright line 
but a spectrum.”  McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 241.  As the economy 
evolves, courts continue to grapple with the challenge of 
placing novel economic relations on the correct point in the 
spectrum.  In many cases that judgment is difficult, and we 
express sympathy for the district judges making these fact-
intensive judgments under such a flexible standard.   
But the case before us is not a hard one.  Here the 
dancers’ relationship to the Club falls well on the “employee” 
side of the line.  Five of the six factors weigh in favor of 
concluding the dancers are Castor’s “employees.”  The only 
factor in Castor’s favor—the permanence of the relationship—
does not cut so strongly in that direction as to come close to 
outweighing the other five.  Thus we easily conclude the 
dancers were “dependent upon the business to which they 
render service.”  Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1293 (quotation 
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omitted).  They were not, as a matter of economic reality, 
operating independent businesses for themselves.  The District 
Court correctly ruled they were employees as a matter of law.  
C. Castor’s Preemption Argument  
Castor asks us to hold, as a matter of first impression, 
that the class claims for unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania 
law are preempted by regulations promulgated by the U.S. 
Department of Labor under the FLSA.  Its arguments, 
however, underwhelm.  Castor does not cite any authority for 
the proposition that the FLSA preempts common-law claims 
like these.  Nor does it contend with the “congressional intent 
not to preempt state standards” we have recognized in the 
FLSA.  Knepper, 675 F.3d at 259.  We have rejected similar 
preemption arguments before, see id. at 263, and Castor does 
not provide any reason to deviate from the general presumption 
that the FLSA is a parallel regime of wage-and-hour 
protections that works in cooperation with, not to the exclusion 
of, other laws protecting workers.  See id. at 263. 
Congress’s recent amendment of the FLSA does not 
change the analysis.  That occurred in 2018.  Through the 
amendment, Congress added a cause of action under the FLSA 
for employees whose tips are taken by their employers.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“Any 
employer who violates section 203(m)(2)(B) of this title shall 
be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount 
of the sum of any tip credit taken by the employer and all such 
tips unlawfully kept by the employer, and in an additional 
equal amount as liquidated damages.”).  Not only was that 
cause of action unavailable at the time of plaintiffs’ trial, but 
Castor gives us no reason to believe it precludes a similar claim 
for unjust enrichment.  As with the other provisions of the 
FLSA, nothing in these new provisions undermines the 
presumption that the FLSA is meant to supplement, not 
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supplant, state laws protecting workers.  We thus reject 
Castor’s contention that the FLSA preempts plaintiffs’ claims 
for unjust enrichment. 
D. Castor’s Request for a Credit or Offset  
Castor claims the jury award should have been reduced 
by the amount of money plaintiffs received directly from 
customers in the form of dance fees.  It concedes that, for the 
class claims under the PMWA, it does not get a credit or offset 
for those fees.  But Castor maintains an offset should have been 
applied to plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims because “it 
would be unjust and inequitable” to allow them to recover 
monies for the tips they were forced to pay other Castor 
employees without giving Castor a credit for the dance fees 
they retained.  In essence, Castor asks us to remake the jury’s 
verdict on damages for unjust enrichment.   
We decline.  First, Castor does not support its argument 
with any citations to the record nor any explanation of how we 
would calculate the amount of credit or offset; by not doing so, 
it arguably has waived this argument on appeal.  See Norman 
v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 111, 129 (3d Cir. 2017) (“For an argument 
to be preserved on appeal it must be presented together with 
supporting arguments and citations.” (quotation marks 
omitted)).  Second, the argument is not persuasive from an 
equitable standpoint.  The jury and the District Court 
concluded that Castor was unjustly enriched because it 
obtained the benefit of the tip-outs that plaintiffs were forced 
to make to other employees of Castor.  It provides no 
persuasive reason to disturb that conclusion.  That Castor did 
not divert all the money plaintiffs received from customers—
namely, the dance fees—does not undermine the jury and the 
District Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs were equitably 
entitled to more than they received.  Accordingly, we affirm 
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the District Court’s denial of Castor’s post-trial request for an 
offset or credit.  
* * * * * 
The District Court had CAFA jurisdiction to try the 
class’s claims under the PMWA and Pennsylvania common 
law.  It also correctly ruled before trial that, as a matter of law, 
plaintiffs were Castor’s employees.  We are not persuaded the 
class’s claims for unjust enrichment are preempted by the 
FLSA, nor is Castor entitled to a credit or an offset of damages 
for the dance fees the class members earned and received.  
Hence we affirm in full the challenged rulings of the District 
Court and sustain the jury’s verdict. 
 
